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Abstract
Why has capitalism prevailed as an institution in promoting economic growth
despite its apparent unfairness? In this paper, we argue that within a neoclassical
framework, capitalism is fairer compared to collectivism due to the absence of a
rationally acceptable collective solution. This is demonstrated using a dynamic
game with a vote-maximizing government(G) and profit-maximizing representa-
tive firm(F). In this GF game, collectivism or cooperation between the players
appears to trump capitalism at the aggregate level. Developing countries operating
below the steady state may be better off cooperating as they will enjoy positive
long term economic growth and profit growth once their capital stock exceeds the
steady state level. But this requires them to sacrifice short term growth and possible
inequity as the firm’s profits grow. Developed countries operating above the steady
state will find the cooperative solution attractive since both economic growth and
profit growth will be positive. So, from an aggregate level, collectivism or cooper-
ation performs better than capitalism. However, a fair imputation of cooperative or
collective solutions which is rationally acceptable for all players does not exist. In
every stage of development, the firm always finds it rationally unacceptable to co-
operate because the profits earned by the firm under the feedback Nash equilibrium
always dominate the profits under cooperation. On the other hand, the government
only finds the cooperative solution to be rationally acceptable when the economy
is above the steady state. Hence, collectivist cooperation between the government
and the firm are not rationally acceptable for both and a fair equilibrium cannot be
attained with collectivism.
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JEL Classification Numbers: D63, 049, C37
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1 Introduction
Since the collapse of communism, it is widely accepted that capitalism is the key to
prosperity and even countries like China, which is communist in ideology, has adopted
capitalism in practice. The raison d’eˆtre in China’s economic policy since the 1980s
can be regarded as one of maximum growth in the initial phase with postponed con-
sumption for a later phase. Yet, such a strategy is not without its problems. Like most
capitalist economies, such an intertemporal contract may be neither acceptable to the
workers who form the core of political support for the party nor sustainable over the
long term. According to World Bank estimates, while the real GDP grew at an annual
average rate of 10 % in China during the last two decades of the last century, the in-
come disparity has also widened. This has prompted many have argued for enforcing
some collective solutions so as to curb the dynamic inefficiency of capitalism and bring
about a “harmonious society”.
This situation is not unique to China. Since Malthus, Ricardo and Marx, “the
essence of capitalism (is perceived) to be centered on the problems of capital accu-
mulation and the distribution of income between workers and capitalists”(Lancaster,
1973). Within such a paradigm, Lancaster(1973) shows that capitalism is dynamically
inefficient when compared to a social optimum which can be achieved by both the
workers and the capitalism cooperating together. The attractiveness of such coopera-
tive or collective outcomes has achieved commanding heights in mid 20th century, with
many countries adopting communism or some forms of socialism. Perhaps because of
the scars from the Great Depression, capitalism was somewhat discredited and the idea
of a “benevolent dictator” appealed to both influential economists and policymakers. In
China, for instance, in the early years (1949-52) of Communist rule, private firms were
allowed to continue their operations but beginning 1953, the capitalists were ordered
to surrender their enterprises, “until they became only managers of the enterprise and
had to follow government instructions if they were to remain part of it.” (Chow 2002).
The collapse of communism and the adoption of capitalism by Communist China, Rus-
sia and Vietnam attest that such collective or cooperative outcomes, while apparently
attractive, is not sustainable. Countries which persist in collective solutions, such as
North Korea and Myanmar(Burma), continue to suffer from dismal growth.
If capitalism is dynamically inefficient, why is it the choice of practically every
economy in the world today? The answer offered here is that capitalism may be
more rationally acceptable and fairer than collectivism. This is demonstrated using
a government-firm (GF) dynamic game with a vote-maximizing government(G) and
profit-maximizing representative firm(F). Capitalism in this paper is defined by the in-
dependent pursuit for profits by the firm whereas with “collectivism”, this objective by
the firm becomes subsumed under some cooperative optimization. In this GF game, a
fair imputation of cooperative or collective solutions which is rationally acceptable for
all players does not exist. Rationally acceptable strategies are the set of cooperative
strategies with payoffs greater than or at least equal to the payoffs from pursuing non-
cooperative strategies. Regardless of the stages of development, the firm always finds
it rationally unacceptable to cooperate because the profits earned by the firm under
the feedback Nash equilibrium always dominate the profits under cooperation. On the
other hand, the government only finds cooperative solution to be rationally acceptable
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when the economy is above the steady state. Below the steady state, developing coun-
tries are trapped in low growth and political instability. Thus, while group rationality
dictates cooperation, such cooperation is not realized because they are not rationally
acceptable for both the government and the firms. As a result, a fair equilibrium at-
tained is equivalent to the feedback Nash equilibrium because the trigger strategies
which are employed to enforce cooperation degenerates easily into the feedback Nash
equilibrium.
Our paper contributes to the game-theoretic literature on capitalism and economic
growth. Phelps and Pollak (1968) were perhaps the first to consider a game-theoretic
approach in economic growth. They modeled economic growth and distribution as an
intergenerational conflict. In their model, the present generation derives its utility from
the consumption pattern of infinitely many nonoverlapping generations but it can only
control its own saving rate. As a result, the Nash equilibrium of this intergenerational
game results in undersaving. Strictly speaking, they neither considered the issues of
distributional conflict between different types of players within each generation and
across generations nor the possibility of cooperation. These issues were explored by
Lancaster (1973) who adopted a two player noncooperative dynamic game where the
workers control the share of their consumption in total output while the capitalists con-
trol the share of investment in the surplus. Comparing the feedback Nash equilibrium
with the cooperative solution (from maximizing a weighted sum of worker and capital-
ist consumption), Lancaster demonstrated that both players obtain more consumption
under cooperation, hence demonstrating the dynamic inefficiency of capitalism. This
has been extended by others (see Dockner et al, 2000 for a survey) in various degrees of
sophistication but the basic conclusion is fundamentally the same. For example, Kaitala
and Pohjola(1990) consider a variation on the original Lancaster model in which the
politically powerful group of workers controls redistribution while the economically
powerful group of capitalists controls accumulation. Grim trigger strategies are em-
ployed by both groups to sustain cooperation as an equilibrium. In their model, the
workers and capitalists receive returns equivalent to the labor and capital share respec-
tively. In all these models, it is implicitly assumed that some binding agreement can be
accepted by all and enforced rigidly, without worrying whether such binding agreement
can be achieved in the first place.
The present model thus departs from the literature in two respects. Firstly, the
government in this present model is a vote-maximizer while the firm receives a re-
turn equivalent to the marginal product of capital. The characterization of the gov-
ernment as a vote-maximizer is a distinctive feature of the present model. This is a
significant departure from conventional economic models, in which the government is
typically characterized as a benevolent dictator which maximizes social welfare. The
idea of a vote-maximizing government follows from Nordhaus(1975). However, the
government in Nordhaus’ political business cycle model faces the short-run Phillips
inflation-unemployment tradeoff. In contrast, the government in this model deals with
the long-run political “tradeoff” between economic growth and distributional equity.
Vote-maximization is not to be taken literally to imply a democracy. Instead, the vote
function in this paper can be interpreted as a function for political support. For in-
stance, in the case of China, the Communist Party depends on the political support of
the people, despite the absence of any democratic mechanisms. Hence, regardless of
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whether a government is democratic or authoritarian, we assume that its main objective
is to maximize its political support or vote function.
Secondly, unlike Lancaster and his follower, we derive explicitly the set of fair
imputations of the cooperative payoffs so as to determine whether the cooperative so-
lution is rationally acceptable. Rationally acceptable strategies exist if a fair imputation
of the cooperative solution offers players higher payoffs compared to those obtained in
a feedback Nash equilibrium. Where rationally acceptable cooperative solution exists,
the fair equilibrium is simply the set of rationally acceptable strategies and cooperation
is enforced through a reciprocal punishment mechanism. Otherwise, the fair equilib-
rium is the set of feedback Nash equilibrium. In this way, our approach is distinct from
those adopted in the recent literature on distributional fairness in growth and devel-
opment, such as Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Benabou and Tirole (2006). These
papers incorporate the economists’ judgment of fairness and equity and ignore the con-
cerns for fairness and equity of the economic players under analysis. In contrast, the
present paper derives the fair equilibrium explicitly from the endogenous and strategic
interactions between the players.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the GF game of
economic growth. The feedback Nash equilibrium and the cooperative solutions are
derived and discussed in Section 3. Section 4 explores the characterization of a fair
equilibrium based on rational acceptability. Section 5 concludes.
2 Government-Firm Game of Economic Growth
Consider a dynamic game of economic growth with two players: a government(G)
and a representative firm(F), henceforth referred to as the GF game. The economy
has a neoclassical production function, which is represented in intensive form as y =
f (k) , f ′ (k)> 0, f ′′ (k)< 0, limk→0 [ f ′ (k)] = ∞, limk→∞ [ f ′ (k)] = 0.The labor force re-
ceives an income equal to its marginal product f (k)−k f ′(k) while capital a rent equiv-
alent to its marginal product f ′(k)−δ, where δ is the depreciation rate.
The firm in the model owns the capital and has to decide between retaining its
capital earnings for investment and consuming the dividends payments. Its objective is
to maximize the stream of dividends payments over time. The present game analysis
suggests a more active role of the firm in the policy-making process. Not only will the
investment strategy of the firms adjust dynamically to the tax policy of the government,
the corporate tax strategy of the government will also change in response to changes in
the firms’ investment policy.
The government is a vote-maximizer: it will adopt policies that will best assure its
continuation in power, increase its political support or improve its vote-getting power.
This is represented using a vote function v [k,x(·),s(·)], where x(·) represents the tax
or social transfer within the government’s control while s(·) represents the investment
rate controlled by a representative firm.
The government’s objective functional can thus be expressed as follows:
max
x(.)
JG (k0,x(·),s(·)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtv [x(·),s(·)]dt.
4
Assume a balanced budget and that the policy instrument x(t) used by the govern-
ment to promote growth and effect redistribution is lump-sum. The government faces
the long-run political tradeoff between long run growth economic growth and distribu-
tional equity. The conflict can be encapsulated in the vote function:
v [k,x(·),s(·)] = f (k)− k f ′ (k)+ x.
The transfer or tax,x(t), on the workers must be less than or equal to their incomes
while redistribution disbursement cannot exceed the marginal product of workers. Sim-
ilarly, the tax must be less than or equal to profits when it is imposed on the firm and
the subsidy to the firm will not exceed its marginal product. Hence, the following
constraint − f (k)+ k. f ′(k)≤ x≤ f (k)− k. f ′(k) is binding.
Assume a representative firm which owns the capital in the production process and
controls investment. The objective of the firm is to maximize the flow of dividend pay-
ment pi [x(·),s(·)] for the planning horizon. Since the government may tax or subsidize
the firm, its after tax/subsidy profit is given by f ′ (k)− x. Out of this after-tax profits,
the firm must decide how much to pay out as dividends to shareholders and how much
to retain for investing in capital by adjusting s(·), the rate of capital investment. The
firm’s objective functional is given by
max
s(.)
JF (k0,x(·),s(·)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt (pi [x(·),s(·)])dt,
where ρ> 0 is a positive discount rate ; k(t0) = k0 > 0 is an initial capital-labor ratio;
s(t) be the investment rate which is controlled by the firm and [pi [x(·),s(·)]) are the
dividends payments, given by
pi [k,x(·),s(·)] = (1− s)[ f ′(k)− x] ,0≤ s≤ 1.
Assume that labor consume fully its wage, thus only the firm contributes to the
accumulation of capital. Capital accumulation then follows the dynamics
k˙ = g(x(.),s(.),k) = s
[
f ′ (k)− x]− (n+δ)k,
where δ denotes effective depreciation for the capital-labor ratio k, n is the popula-
tion growth rate and n+ δ > 0 ;x is a per person lump sum which is controlled by the
government, so that f ′ (k)− x is the after tax/subsidy profit for the firm.
The GF game thus described involves the government and the private sector acting
independently, affecting a common state variable and each other’s payoffs through time
and is hence a dynamic game. In this GF game, each player takes into account the
other player’s decision while making his own decisions. Since the game is dynamic,
each player will take into account not only the current but also future decisions of the
other player.
The complete GF game, Γ(k), can be characterized as follows:
Government
max
x(.)
JG (k0,x(·),s(·)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
[
f (k)− k. f ′ (k)+ x]dt, (1)
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Firm
max
s(.)
JF (k0,x(·),s(·)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt (1− s)[ f ′(k)− x]dt, (2)
subject to
k˙ = s
[
f ′ (k)− x]− (n+δ)k, k(0) = k0 (3)
0≤ s ≤ 1 (4)
− f (k)+ k. f ′ (k)≤ x ≤ f ′ (k) (5)
The control function pair (x(·),s(·)) is such that x(·) : [0,∞)→ X and s(·) : [0,∞)→
S where X and S are the control sets of the government and the firm respectively.
Assume information is complete.
Alternatively, a cooperative GF game can be defined as Γc (k), which denotes a
cooperative game between the government and the firm with the game structure of
Γ(k), given some initial state k0. Group rationality dictates the joint maximization of
the sum of payoffs for both players. Specifically,
max
x(.)
JC (k0,x(·),s(·)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt {v [k,x(·),s(·)]+pi [k,x(·),s(·)]}dt, (6)
subject to (3) through (5)
3 Feedback Nash Equilibrium and Cooperative Solu-
tions
In this section, the feedback Nash equilibrium to the GF game, Γ(k), and the coopera-
tive solutions to the cooperative GF game, ΓC(k), are derived. These solutions are then
computed for a common specification of the neoclassical production function.
3.1 Feedback Nash Equilibrium
In the GF game, Γ(k), the problem for the government is to take s(·) as given and
choose a transfer/tax strategy, x(·), so as to maximize its political payoff (1). Taking
x(·) as given, the firm chooses an investment strategy,s(·), so as to maximize its after
tax profit flow (2). Both are subject to the constraints (3) through (5). This section
discusses the feedback Nash equilibrium to the GF game Γ(k).
Theorem 3.1 A set of strategies {x¯(k), s¯(k)} constitutes a feedback Nash equilibrium
solution to the game Γ(k) if there exists functionals, JG(k) : Rm→R and JF(k) : Rm→R
satisfying the following set of partial differential equations:
ρJG(k) = max
x
{
v(k,x, s¯)+ JGk (k)g(k,x, s¯)
}
(7)
ρJF(k) = max
s
{
pi(k, x¯,s)+ JFk (k)g(k, x¯,s)
}
(8)
6
where
JG(k) =
∫ ∞
τ
e−ρ(t−τ)
[
f (k)− k. f ′(k)+ x]dt (9)
JF(k) =
∫ ∞
τ
e−ρ(t−τ)(1− s)[ f ′(k)− x]dt, (10)
represents the current value payoffs of the government and the firm at time τ
Proposition 3.2 The feedback Nash equilibrium (x¯(k) , s¯(k)) for Γ(k) is given by
(x¯(k) , s¯(k)) =
(
f ′ (k) ,0
)
(11)
Proof A noncooperative feedback Nash equilibrium solution to Γ(k) is characterized
by:
ρJG (k) = max
x
{
f (k)− k f ′ (k)+ x+ JGk (k)
(
s¯
[
f ′ (k)− x]− (n+δ)k)} (12)
ρJF (k) = max
s
{
(1− s)[ f ′ (k)− x¯)+ JFk (k)(s[ f ′ (k)− x¯]− (n+δ)k)} (13)
Performing the above maximizations yields:
x¯(k) = f ′ (k) , s¯(k) = 0
If the tax is x¯(k) = f ′ (k), the whole rental income of the firm is effectively taxed
away and the firm will have to stop investing, thus s¯(k) = 0. The economic intuition is
as follows. In the GF game, a government may postpone redistribution to later stages
so as to facilitate the most rapid economic growth. But the firm predicts as much
and being free to optimize on its investment decisions, will stop investing just before
profits are being taxed. But the government is also aware of the firm’s reaction: its best
response is to impose taxes on capital income earlier. The process will then converge
to the feedback Nash equilibrium (x¯(k) , s¯(k)) = ( f ′ (k) ,0).
Proposition 3.3 The feedback Nash equilibrium (x¯(k) , s¯(k)) for Γ(k) is both time
consistent and subgame perfect.
Proof First denote any subgame of Γ(k) by Γ(0,kτ).
To establish time consistency, note that {x¯i (τ,T,) s¯i (τ,T,)} , i= 1, · · · ,N constitutes
a set of equilibrium for the subgame Γ
(
τ, k¯ (τ)
)
,where k¯(τ) = k (0, t,{x¯i(0,τ), s¯i(0,τ)})
for every i = 1, · · · ,N and τ ∈ (0,∞).
To establish subgame perfectness, note that for every τ ∈ (0,T ), the feedback Nash
equilibrium {x¯i(τ,T ), s¯i(τ,T )} constitutes a set of equilibrium for the subgame Γ(t1,kτ)
where kτ ∈ Rm is an arbitrarily chosen state which is reachable from some initial state
at t0 = 0.
Substitution of these into (12) and (13) to solve for the value functions of the gov-
ernment and the firm respectively:
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JG (k) =
1
ρ
{
f (k)− k f ′ (k)+ f ′ (k)} (14)
JF (k) = −1
ρ
(n+δ)k (15)
It is straightforward to derive the economic growth rate which is given by
y˙
y
= f ′ (k)
k˙
f (k)
=
[
k f ′ (k)/ f (k)
]( k˙
k
)
=−[k f ′ (k)/ f (k)](n+δ)
Similarly, the rate of growth of after-transfer profits, denoted by p˙ipi , can be easily
obtained: p˙ipi =− k˙k = (n+δ).
Both the economic growth rate and the rate of growth of after tax profits depends on
the level of breakeven investment, denoted by (n+δ), defined as the level of investment
needed to keep k at its existing level. Given the feedback Nash equilibrium (x¯(k) , s¯(k))
for the game Γ(k), the breakeven investment will depend on the capital labor ratio k.
Below steady state, (n+ δ) < 0, at steady state, (n+ δ) = 0 and above steady state,
(n+δ)> 0.
Thus, in the feedback Nash equilibrium, the economy in a developing country be-
low the steady state has positive growth but will stop growing eventually because the
firms are getting subnormal profits and will not be motivated to invest. Those firms
in countries which have achieved steady state growth and beyond, will break even or
enjoy supernormal profits and enter into higher levels of investment.
In short, the consequences of the feedback Nash equilibrium in terms of economic
growth rate, the profitability of the firm and capital accumulation will be more adverse
for the developing countries than relatively more developed countries.
The results so far are not controversial and are similar to Lancaster(1973) and
Kaitala and Pohjola(1990). These authors went on to argue that cooperation between
the government and the firm will be more beneficial compared to the dynamic inef-
ficiency of capitalism. They assumed implicitly that the cooperative solution will be
accepted by all. In the case of Kaitala and Pohjola(1990), the cooperation is enforced
by trigger threats that force everyone to cooperate but whether such a cooperation is fair
or not is not considered. In the next section, the cooperative solution to the game and
the set of fair imputations of the cooperative payoff are explicitly derived so as to de-
termine whether cooperation is indeed rationally acceptable compared to the feedback
Nash equilibrium.
3.2 Cooperative Solutions
Consider a cooperative GF game Γc (k).
Theorem 3.4 A set of strategies {xˆ(k) , sˆ(k)} constitutes a solution to the game Γc (k)
if there exists functionals, W G (k) : Rm→R satisfying the infinite horizon Bellman equa-
tion:
ρJC (k) = max
x,s
{
v(k,x,s)+ JCk (k)g(k,x,s)
}
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where JCk (k)g(k,x,s) =
∫ ∞
τ e
−ρ(t−τ) [ f (k)− (1− k) f ′ (k)− s( f ′ (k)− x)]dt.
More specifically, the cooperative solution of the GF game Γc (k) can be obtained
by considering the optimization problem
max
x(.),s(.)
JC (k0,x(·),s(·)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
[
f (k)− (1− k) f ′ (k)− s( f ′ (k)− x)]dt, (16)
subject to (3) through (5).
Due to the simple linear structure of the model, the problem can be solved more
directly by applying the Most Rapid Approach Path (MRAP) technique. First, use the
state equation (3) to obtain
JC (k0,x(·),s(·)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
[
f (k)− (1− k) f ′ (k)− (k˙+(n+δ)k)]dt
.
Next, integrate the term containing k˙ and use the initial condition k(0) = k0 to
obtain
JC (k0,x(·),s(·)) = k0+
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt [h(k)− ((n+δ+ρ)k)]dt.
where h(k) = f (k)− (1− k) f ′ (k). The integrand in this representation of the ob-
jective functional JC is strictly concave of the state variable k and attains its maximum
at the unique steady state value k = kSS defined by the equation h′(kSS) = n+δ+ρ. It
follows that to maximize JC, the state trajectory must approach the steady state kSS as
fast as possible and remain there forever. It is trivial that this is the case if and only if
the controls are selected as follows:
sˆ[ f ′ (k)− xˆ] =
 f (k)+(1− k) f
′ (k)
(n+δ)k
0
k < kSS
k = kSS
k > kSS
(17)
From this, it is straightforward to derive the set of cooperative strategies to the
game.
Proposition 3.5 The set of cooperative strategies {xˆ(k) , sˆ(k)} to the game Γc (k) is
given by
sˆ(k) =
 1u, u ∈ (0,1]0
k < kSS
k = kSS
k > kSS
(18)
xˆ(k) =

k f ′ (k)− f (k)
f ′ (k)− (n+δ)u−1k, u ∈ (0,1]
f (k)
k < kSS
k = kSS
k > kSS
(19)
It is reasonable to define a fair imputation of the cooperative payoff for each player
as one which includes their Nash payoffs and half of their cooperative gains. Hence,
the imputed payoffs for each player in the cooperative game JC =
{
JCG,JCF
}
are
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JCG (k) =
1
ρ
{
f (k)− k f ′ (k)+ 1
2
[
s f ′ (k)− (n+δ)k]} (20)
JCF (k) =
1
ρ
{
(s−2)
2
f ′ (k)−
(
n+δ
2
)
k
}
(21)
Accordingly, denote vˆ≡ ρJCG and pˆi≡ ρJCF , the
vˆ(k) =

f (k)− k f ′ (k)+ 12 [ f ′ (k)− (n+δ)k]
f (k)+
( 1
2 u− k
)
f ′ (k)−
(
n+δ
2
)
k
f (k)− k f ′ (k)− 12 (n+δ)k
k < kSS
k = kSS,0 < u≤ 1
k > kSS
(22)
pˆi(k) =

− 12 f ′ (k)−
(
n+δ
2
)
k
(u−2)
2 f
′ (k)−
(
n+δ
2
)
k
− f ′ (k)−
(
n+δ
2
)
k
k < kSS
k = kSS,0 < u≤ 1
k > kSS
(23)
Similarly, the growth rate and the rate of growth for the after tax profit can be
computed respectively.
y˙
y
=

− [k f ′ (k)/ f (k)] ([ f ′ (k)− f (k)]/k− f ′ (k)− (n+δ))(n+δ)
0
[k f ′ (k)/ f (k)] (n+δ)2
k < kSS
k = kSS
k > kSS
p˙i
pi
=
 ( f (k)+(1− k) f
′ (k))/k− (n+δ)
0
(n+δ)
k < kSS
k = kSS
k > kSS
3.3 Solutions for Specific Neoclassical Production Function
To make concrete the solution concepts and allow easy comparison, it is useful to
adopt a specific neoclassical function. The most common specification for this in the
literature is the constant elasticity of substitution production function,given by:
y = f (k) = A˜ · [a · (bk)ψ+(1−a) · (1−b)ψ] 1ψ (24)
where 0 < a < 1,o < b < 1 and ψ < 1. The marginal product of capital are given
by
f ′ (k) = A˜abψ
[
a ·bψ+(1−a) · (1−b)ψ · k−ψ] 1−ψψ (25)
Without loss of generality, this can be simplified to a Cobb-Douglas form by letting
ψ< 1→ 0 and applying l’Hoˆpital’s rule to obtain f (k)=Aka, where A= A˜ba(1−b)1−a
and 0 < a < 1.
The results are summarized in the table 1.
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From these, the economic growth rate and the rate of growth of after-tax profits for
the firm can be derived for the cooperative solutions.
y˙
y
=
 −a
(
Aka−1
(
k−1−2)− (n+δ))(n+δ)
0
a(n+δ)2
k < kSS
k = kSS
k > kSS
p˙i
pi
=
 Ak
a−1 [(1−a)+ak−1]
0
(n+δ)
k < kSS
k = kSS
k > kSS
Table 2 summarizes summarizes the direction of change for both economic growth
rates y˙y and profit growth rates
p˙i
pi under feedback Nash equilibrium and cooperative
solution.
sgn
(
y˙
y
)
sgn
( p˙i
pi
)
Feedback Nash Cooperative Feedback Nash Cooperative
Below kss + - - +
At kss 0 0 0 0
Above kss - + + +
Table 2: Economic Growth Rates y˙y and Profit Growth Rates
p˙i
pi under Feedback Nash
Equilibrium and Cooperative Solution
From table 2, three key observations can be made:
1. Below the steady state, the economic growth rate under the feedback Nash equi-
librium is positive while that under cooperation is negative.
2. The rate of economic growth and profit growth are both zero at the steady state.
3. Above the steady state, both the economic growth rate and the profit growth rate
are positive under cooperation whereas only the profit growth rate is positive
under the feedback Nash equilibrium.
An interpretation for these observations would be as follows. At the aggregate level,
developing countries operating below the steady state may be better off cooperating as
they will enjoy positive long term economic growth and profit growth once their capital
stock exceeds the steady state level. But this requires them to sacrifice short term
growth and possible inequity as the firm’s profits grow. Developed countries operating
above the steady state will find the cooperative solution attractive since both economic
growth and profit growth will be positive. So, from an aggregate level, collectivism
or cooperation performs better than capitalism. This is the dynamic inefficiency of
capitalism.
However, the collective solution requires a short term sacrifice for the voters in
developing countries. the logical question which follows would be: will such a sacrifice
be rationally acceptable? To answer this question, one must derive the fair imputations
for each players and compare these to the feedback Nash outcomes. This is what we
set out to do in the next section.
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4 Rational Acceptability and Fair Equilibrium
In this GF game of growth, the cooperative solution can be interpreted as a social
contract between the voters, the government and the firm, whereby the voters curtailed
their present consumption for economic growth with the expectation that at some point
in the future, the government will ensure a transfer to them for the earlier sacrifice. On
the other hand, in the context of a communist country, it can be interpreted as the firm
subjecting itself to the collective will. In both cases, the idea is to prevent the dynamic
inefficiency of capitalism. But is the cooperative solution, which is derived from a fair
imputation of the collective maximization, necessarily better than the feedback Nash
equilibrium? To achieve such a comparison, it is important to establish some criteria for
comparison. In this case, the criteria considered is fairness: is the cooperative solution
fair to every players in the GF game?
4.1 Rational Acceptability
The characterization of fair equilibrium is not easy. There are many definitions of
fairness. One can focus the discussion of fair equilibrium here by invoking the idea of
rationally acceptable strategies. It is reasonable to view any policies that are rationally
acceptable to all parties as a pre-requisite to a fair equilibrium. Before proceeding to
define the fair equilibrium, it is useful to define rational acceptability.
Definition A cooperative strategies pair (xˆ, sˆ) is rationally acceptable to both players
at initial time t0 and state k0 if and only if the continuation of this strategy pair at
(τ,k(τ)) yields payoffs that are greater than or at least equal to the payoffs obtained with
the continuation of the feedback Nash solutions at (τ,k(τ)) for all possible (τ,k(τ))
such that τ> o and k(τ)≥ k0 for all players.
Substitute the set of cooperative controls {xˆ(k) , sˆ(k)} into (3) to obtain the dynam-
ics of the optimal cooperative trajectory
k˙ = g [k,x(k) ,s(k)] = sˆ(k)
[
f ′ (k)− xˆ(k)]− (n+δ)k, k (0) = k0 (26)
Let kˆ denote the solution to (26). Denote ξi(kˆ), i ∈ {G,F} to be an imputation of
the payoffs of the ith player.
For the cooperative solution to be rationally acceptable, the following condition is
required:
ξi(kˆ)≥ Ji(kˆ), ∀i ∈ {G,F} (27)
If such an acceptable cooperative solution exists, then the next step involves deter-
mining whether it is time consistent or dynamically stable.
Theorem 4.1 A time consistent solution to Γc(kˆ0) is given by the instantaneous payoff
set at time τ ∈ [0,T ]
JCi (τ) = ξi
(
kˆτ
)−ξikˆτ (kˆτ ·g[kˆτ, xˆ(kˆτ) , sˆ(kˆτ)])
for all τ ∈ [0,T ] , i ∈ {G,F}
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Proof See appendix
The intuition here is that JCi (τ) is the transitory or instantaneous payoff that sus-
tains a time consistent solution to the cooperative game.
4.2 Fair Equilibrium
Having considered the concept of rational acceptability, the next step is to establish
such a class of fair equilibrium. This paper establishes the fair equilibrium, in which
players adopt trigger strategies that pose as threats to discourage players from deviating
from their cooperative policies. In dynamic games, the characterization of such an
equilibrium is necessarily complicated by the fact that the payoffs are contingent on
the whole history of the game. Tolwinski et al (1986) proposed memory dependent
trigger strategies and threat to maintain the agreed-upon cooperative path. This was
adopted by Kaitala and Pohjola(1990) to enforce their cooperative equilibrium.
In this paper, a fair equilibrium is defined as follows:
1. If rationally acceptable cooperative solutions exist, the fair equilibrium will be
the set of rationally cooperative solutions.
2. In the absence of such rationally acceptable cooperative solutions, the fair equi-
librium is equivalent to the feedback Nash equilibrium.
3. The fair equilibrium must be time consistent.
More formally,
Definition The fair equilibrium for the game is the pair of strategies (x∗(·),s∗(·)),
described by:
x∗(τ0) = xˆ(τ0)
and
x∗(τ j) =
{
xˆ if x(τ) = xˆ(τ) for almost all τ≤ τ j,
x¯(k(τ j)) otherwise
and
s∗(τ0) = sˆ(τ0)
and
s∗(τ j) =
{
sˆ if s(τ) = sˆ(τ) for almost all τ≤ τ j,
s¯(k(τ j)) otherwise
where k (τ j) is the state observed at τ j ∈ [0,∞] .
Can such the fair equilibrium be attained in the GF game? From figures 1 and 2, it
is evident that in this GF game with a neoclassical production technology, there can be
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no rationally acceptable cooperative outcomes for countries in the initial stage of devel-
opment or k < kSS. For these countries, the cooperative payoff for both the government
and the firm is worse than the feedback Nash outcome. Accordingly, the cooperative
solution is rationally unacceptable, hence the fair equilibrium will be equivalent to the
feedback Nash equilibrium. The consequences for the developing countries are vicious
cycles of low growth and low capital accumulation and government end up with zero
payoffs or very low political support.
Figure 1: Payoffs for the Government under Cooperative and Feedback Nash Equilib-
rium
At a very advanced stage of development,k > kSS, the government will find the
cooperative solution to be rationally acceptable as its vote payoff increases but the
firm will continue to find it rationally unacceptable to cooperate because the profits
earned by the firm under the feedback Nash equilibrium still dominate the profits under
cooperation. Cooperation breaks down and the feedback Nash equilibrium is adopted,
but the consequences are not so dire in this case, because the firm can realize a positive
and steady profit growth in this case while the economic growth for such countries are
steady and positive.
At the steady state, the firm will not cooperate because doing so is put it at a disad-
vantage compared to its feedback Nash outcome. The government will find the coop-
erative solution to be rationally acceptable in some cases and unacceptable in others.
Hence, a fair equilibrium cannot be attained because the trigger strategies which
are employed to enforce cooperation degenerates easily into the feedback Nash equi-
librium. While group rationality may dictates cooperation, such cooperation is not
realized even with fair imputations of the cooperative rewards because they are not
15
Figure 2: Payoffs for the Firm under Cooperative and Feedback Nash Equilibrium
rationally acceptable for both the government and the firms. Regardless of the stages
of development, the firm always finds it rationally unacceptable to cooperate while the
the government only finds cooperative solution to be rationally acceptable when the
economy is above the steady state. Below the steady state, developing countries are
trapped in low growth and political instability.
These results depart from Lancaster (1973) and Kaitala and Pohjola(1990). Both
these papers argue that cooperation can help resolve the dynamic inefficiency of cap-
italism. The results here demonstrates unequivocally that such cooperation cannot be
rationally acceptable even if fair imputations of the cooperative payoffs are awarded to
each players. A fair equilibrium that is enforced by trigger strategies cannot even be
attained because of the strong dominance of the feedback Nash payoffs for the players
in most cases. Consequently, in a neoclassical growth model, capitalism may be more
rationally acceptable than collectivism or other forms of cooperative solutions.
5 Concluding Remarks
Capitalism has prevailed as an institution in promoting economic growth. This paper
argues that capitalism prevails as an institution as it is more rationally acceptable than
collectivism.
The paper proposes a dynamic GF game with a vote-maximizing government and
profit-maximizing representative firm. In the feedback Nash equilibrium, a government
may postpone redistribution to later stages so as to facilitate the most rapid economic
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growth. But the firm predicts as much and being free to optimize on its investment
decisions, will stop investing just before profits are being taxed. But the government
is also aware of the firm’s reaction: its best response is to impose taxes on capital
income earlier. The process will then converge to the feedback Nash equilibrium, with
the government taxing away all the profits of the firm and the firm will eventually
stop investing altogether. The political support for the government falls. Thus, in the
feedback Nash equilibrium, the economy in a developing country below the steady
state will stop growing eventually because the firms are getting subnormal profits and
will not be motivated to invest. This in turn perpetuates a vicious cycle of low capital
accumulation level, low growth and political instability. Those in countries that have
achieved steady state growth and beyond enjoyed normal or supernormal profits and
enter into a virtuous cycle of higher levels of investment and positive growth. These
results are consistent with the literature, which suggests that capitalism is dynamically
inefficient.
The implication here appears to be that a cooperative or collective solution should
be enforced through a “benevolent dictator”. This concurs with Lancaster(1973) and
Kaitala and Pohjola(1990). On the other hand, we also explicitly demonstrate in this
paper that a cooperative or collective solution which is rationally acceptable to all play-
ers may not exist in a neoclassical growth model. This is because the firm will always
finds it rationally unacceptable to cooperate since the profits earned by the firm un-
der the feedback Nash equilibrium always dominate the profits under cooperation; the
government only finds cooperative solution to be rationally acceptable when the econ-
omy is above the steady state. Developing countries are hence trapped in low growth
and political instability. Generally, cooperation is not rationally acceptable for both
the government and the firm. As a result, a fair equilibrium attained is equivalent to
the feedback Nash equilibrium because the trigger strategies which are employed to
enforce cooperation degenerates easily into the feedback Nash equilibrium. The sig-
nificant insight here is that capitalism may be more rationally acceptable and fairer
compared to collectivism.
Hence, this model serves to illustrate the importance of rational acceptability in
obtaining fair equilibrium. Existing literature takes for granted that cooperative solu-
tions are always preferred to non-cooperative solutions in a static context. In contrast,
we use the rational acceptability criteria to demonstrate that the existence of rational
acceptable cooperative equilibrium solutions in dynamic games is not trivial. As a re-
sult, even if cooperative solutions may trump the non-cooperative solutions in some
truncated subgames, the failure of arriving at some rationally acceptable fair imputa-
tions of the cooperative outcomes for each players for the overall game may undermine
cooperation.
The feedback solution in which the rent of the firm is totally taxed away is ad-
mittedly extreme and unrealistic. In practice, the political pressure to redistribute is
always present for both developing and developed countries though it is unlikely that
the government will completely tax away the rent of the firm. Our key insight on this
issue is that the consequences for taxing the firm are less dire for developed countries
than developing countries.
Another key assumption in this paper is that both the government and the firm rep-
resent the interests of their respective principals effectively. The government in the
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model depends very much on voters (workers) for political support while the firm de-
pends on their shareholders for support. As such, the government is an agent for the
voters (workers) while the firm is an agent for their shareholders. How do the principals
ensure that their respective agents will exert efforts to represent their interests? In this
principal-agent scenario, the rational acceptability of the outcome may be contingent
on the performance of the government and the firm as perceived by their principals.
Effectively, this would be a multi-principals-agents dynamic game. Establishing ratio-
nally acceptable outcomes for players with different objective functionals and possibly
different state equations is challenging and best reserved for future research.
As a caveat, it should be emphasized that this paper should not be perceived as a
carte blanche endorsement of capitalism. Indeed, the dynamic inefficiency of capital-
ism is a real one so that it is always easy and tempting to argue for some collective
solution in the face of such inefficiency. This is the case for China, where embracing
capitalism has brought about phenomenal growth and widening disparity, prompting
recent debates about bringing about a “harmonious society” through a return to some
forms of collectivism. However, if capitalism is more rationally acceptable than col-
lectivism, such collective solutions are bound to fail, as they had in the past. A policy
implication would be that policymakers have to work harder to come up with more cre-
ative solutions to achieve a “harmonious society” within a capitalist framework rather
than imposing rationally unacceptable collective solutions.
References
[1] Alesina, Alberto and George-Marios Angeletos (2005) Fairness and Redistribu-
tion, American Economic Review, 95 (4), 960-980.
[2] Barro, Robert J and Sala-i-Martin, Xavier (2004) Economic Growth. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
[3] Benabou, Roland and Jean Tirole (2006) Belief in a Just World and Redistributive
Politics, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(2): 699-746.
[4] Chow, Gregory C (2002) China’s Economic Transformation. Oxford: Blackwell.
[5] Clemhout, S and Henry Wan(1994) Differential Games - Economic Applications,
in : Aumann,R, Hart,S (eds), Handbook of Game Theory Volume 2, 801-825. Ams-
terdam/New York: Elsevier/North-Holland.
[6] Dockner, Engelbert J, Steffen Jorgensen, Ngo Van Long and Gerhard Sorger (2000)
Differential Games in Economics and Management Science. Cambridge, UK: Cam-
bridge University Press.
[7] Kaitala, Veijo and Matti Pohjola (1990) Economic Development and Agreeable
Redistribution in Capitalism: Efficient Game Equilibria in a Two-Class Neoclassical
Growth Model”, International Economic Review, 31(2), 421-438.
[8] Lancaster, Kelvin (1973) The Dynamic Inefficiency of Capitalism, Journal of Po-
litical Economy, 81, 1092-1109.
18
[9] Nordhaus, William D (1975) The Political Business Cycle, Review of Economic
Studies, 42, 169-190.
[10] Phelps, E S and R A Pollak (1968) On Second-best National Saving and Game
Equilibrium Growth, Review of Economic Studies, 35, 185-199.
[11] Tolwinski, B, A Haurie and G Leitmann (1984) Cooperative Equilibria in Differ-
ential Games, Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, 119, 192-202.
[12] World Bank (2005) World Development Report 2006, Washington, DC: World
Bank.
19
